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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Derk Warner Howard appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty plea to manufacturing a controlled substance (marijuana), claiming the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress and his motion for reconsideration. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts underlying Howard's arrest for manufacturing a controlled substance 
(marijuana), as found by the district court, are as follows (with bracketed references to 
the transcript): 
DETECTIVE JEROD SWEESY: Sweesy is a detective for the 
Idaho State Police (ISP) and has been employed with ISP for the last 20 
years. [Tr., p.10, Ls.18-19; p.17, Ls.15-17.] He holds a Master Certificate 
from POST and has investigated approximately 75 to 100 marijuana grow 
operations. [Tr., p.17, Ls.9-14; p.19, Ls.10-21.] He is trained in the 
enforcement and eradication of marijuana grow operations, as well as 
other illegal narcotics investigations. [Tr., p.17, Ls.18-22.] Over the years 
of such investigations, he has had experience in detecting the odor of 
marijuana, both processed and growing. [Tr., p.18, Ls.6-22.] On August 
30, 2011, ISP received an anonymous tip that Mr. Howard, the defendant, 
had a marijuana grow in a ravine south of his residence. [Tr., p.10, L.25 -
.11, L.14.] After receiving this information, Sweesy went to Google Earth 
to locate the Howard residence and verify the existence of the ravine, 
which existed. [Tr., p.13, Ls.3-13.] 
On the morning of August 31, 2011, Sweesy, Ward, and Otto drove 
to the location of the anonymous tip. [Tr., p.13, Ls.19-23.J They turned 
onto a dirt/gravel road off of Old Highway 30 and proceeded generally 
east to a fork in the road. [Tr., p.14, L.6 - p.16, L.5.] They then 
proceeded to the right, to a white building where the road ended. [Tr., 
p.16, Ls.14-17.] They then walked the ravine to the vicinity of the Howard 
residence. [Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.16, L.17.] They did not locate or find any 
evidence of a marijuana grow. [Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.] They then 
decided to make contact with Mr. Howard at his residence. [Tr., p.19, L.25 
- p.20, L.4.] The officers returned to their truck and proceeded back to the 
fork in the road, where they took the left fork further east, until they arrived 
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at the Howard residence. [Tr., p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.13.] They never 
observed any "no trespassing" signs. [Tr., p.39, L.18 - p.40, L.23; p.110, 
Ls.11-15.] When they arrived at the Howard residence, they parked at a 
location on the road just west of the Howard driveway. (Exhibit #4). [Tr., 
p.21, L.14 - p.22, L.13.] 
The officers then exited their truck and walked up the Howard 
driveway to a path/walkway, which led to what they thought was the 
defendant's front door, which was on the east side of the residence. [Tr., 
p.22, Ls.14-19.] Ward knocked on the door and he and Sweesy waited for 
an answer for approximately 30 to 45 seconds. [Tr., p.23, Ls.2-8; p.109, 
Ls.8-9; p.82, Ls.11-16.] While at the door, Sweesy detected the odor of 
marijuana coming from the west. [Tr., p.23, L.16 - p. 24, L.3.] He testified 
that there was a light wind coming out of the west. [Id.] When there was 
no answer, they returned to their truck. [Tr., p.24, Ls.8-21.] Sweesy then 
walked west in an attempt to determine where the marijuana odor was 
coming from. [Id.] As he walked west on the road, he observed what he 
described as an open air shed/barn that was northwest of the residence. 
[Tr., p.25, Ls.3-9.] He testified that from the road, he observed white 
strings hanging from the trusses of the shed, and spaces of the siding of 
the shed allowed him to observe an "emerald green" color inside the shed. 
[Tr., p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.21; p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.15. 1] Sweesy testified 
that the color he observed was consistent with marijuana plants and that it 
is common in grow operations to use the hanging strings to support the 
growing marijuana plants. [Tr., p.25, L.13 - p.26, L.3; p.31, Ls.13-21.] 
Sweesy then retrieved a camera from his vehicle and began taking 
photos from the road. (Exhibit #5, Photos 9251-61). [Tr., p.26, Ls.9-18; 
p.54, L.18 - p.57, L.14.] Photos 9251 and 9252 depict the Howard 
residence. [Tr., p.55, Ls.8-23.] Photos 9253-55 depict west [sic] side of 
the Howard residence, from the road; the shed to the northwest of the 
Howard residence; and a brown truck and backhoe west of the Howard 
residence and a white Suburban southwest of the shed, between the shed 
and the residence. [Tr., p.56, L.8 - p.57, L.11.] Sweesy proceeded to 
take photos from an open field west of a fence line that separated the 
open filed from the Howard residence and the shed. [Tr., p.57, L.22 -
p.58, L.3.] Photos 9256-61 depict various views of the shed with and 
without the use of a zoom lens. [Tr., p.57, L.22 - p.60, L.20.] Sweesy 
testified that the photos taken show the white strings hanging from the 
trusses of the shed and depict the green marijuana plants through the 
gaps in the cedar siding. [Tr., p.58, L.4 - p.60, L.20.] 
1 Det. Sweesy testified that he saw the strings hanging from the trusses of the shed 
when he was still on the roadway (Tr., p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.12); however, it was not until 
he walked north up the fence line that he was able to observe the "bright emerald green 
plants" between the slats of the outbuilding (Tr., p.30, L.17 - p.31, L.15). 
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After taking the photos, Sweesy was at the southwest corner of the 
fence line and road when the defendant arrived at the residence. [Tr., 
p.61, Ls.7-23.] After taking the photos, Sweesy called Sgt. Fullmer to start 
the paperwork for a search warrant. [Tr., p.64, Ls.5-16.] Sweesy testified 
that the defendant arrived in a brown truck with a passenger. [Tr., p.61, 
L. 7 - p.62, L.1.] He identified the brown truck in Photo 9253, as the truck 
the defendant arrived in.r21 Sweesy identified himself to the defendant as 
an ISP officer. [Tr., p.63, Ls.15-18.] The defendant told the officer, 
multiple times, that they were trespassing and had to leave. [Tr., p.63, 
Ls.18-20; p.114, L.13 - p.115, L.16.] Sweesy asked the defendant if he 
was growing marijuana; the defendant denied such. Sweesy asked the 
defendant if he wanted to see the photos and the defendant responded, "I 
don't need to." [Tr., p.65, Ls.17-22.] Sweesy advised the defendant that 
he was in the process of obtaining a search warrant and advised the 
2 The district court was mistaken. The record does not show that Howard drove the 
brown truck seen in photo 9253 to his residence that day. (See Tr., p.56, L.8 - p.57, 
L.1.) To the contrary, the district court specifically found that "[t]he photographic 
evidence taken by Sweesy and the time sequence of those photos, clearly contradict 
the testimony of the defendant that those photos were taken after he arrived." (R., p.55 
(emphasis added); see R., p.52 ("The Court must find that photos 9251-61 were taken 
before the defendant arrived at his residence."). Moreover, Howard testified that he 
drove a different brown truck to his residence and parked it next to an inoperative brown 
truck that the court and parties had seen (impliedly in the photo), as the following 
colloquy shows: 
Q. Where did you park your vehicle when you came to the residence 
on August 31 s\ 2011? 
A. Parked it right here right next to this other brown truck. 
Q. So this brown truck that's in the satellite photo, is that the same 
brown truck we've seen in the -
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. How come that truck doesn't move? 
A. It's broke down now, I guess. 
Q. Okay. So you parked - You parked next to this brown truck? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.151, Ls.9-22.) 
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defendant that he had two options: (1) consent to a search and he would 
not be arrested or (2 ) he would obtain a search warrant. [Tr., p.65, L.6 -
p.66, L.9.] Sweesy further advised the defendant that he had the right to 
refuse to consent. [Tr., p.66, Ls.17-22.] The defendant responded by 
saying, "let's cut'em down." [Tr., p.66, Ls.9-11.] Sweesy then advised 
Fullmer that the defendant had consented to a search and a search 
warrant was not necessary. [Tr., p.67, Ls.1-8.] Sweesy requested "raid 
equipment" to take and package the evidence he obtained. [Id.] He also 
asked for additional assistance to carry out the search. [Id.] Other ISP 
officers arrived to assist, approximately 30 minutes after the request. [Tr., 
p.67, L.23 - p.68, L.2.] The scene was videotaped and photographed 
before any evidence was taken. [Tr., p.68, Ls.3-5.] 
The interactions and conversations with the defendant were not 
recorded. [Tr., p.68, L.19 - p.69, L.15.] Sweesy assumed that the road 
from Old Highway 30 to the Howard residence was a public road. [Tr., 
p.70, L.9 - p.71, L.9.] Sweesy did not see the "no trespassing" sign on the 
Howard property until it was mentioned by the defendant. [Tr., p.39, L.18 
- p.41, L.8; 98, L.13 - p.99, L.5.] It would not have been visible from the 
direction in which the officers approached the property. [Tr., p.35, Ls.1-
17; p.39, L.17 - p.41, L.8.] According to Sweesy, the defendant was free 
to leave, but was not free to enter his property until the evidence had been 
collected. [Tr., p.65, Ls.6-9; p.95, L.21 - p.96, L.1.] The defendant was 
never placed in handcuffs. [Tr., p.170, Ls.5-7.] 
TROOPER STEVE OTTO: Otto has been a patrol officer for ISP for 4 
years. [Tr., p.107, Ls.6-14.] He has POST certification at the intermediate 
level and he has training in the area of detecting controlled substances. 
[Tr., p.107, L.17-p.108, L.14.] He participated in the investigation of Mr. 
Howard on August 31, 2011. [Tr., p.108, Ls.19-24.] The officers exited off 
Old Highway 30 onto a dirt/gravel road. [Tr., p.110, Ls.6-1 O.] As they 
were travelling on this road, Otto was "actively looking" for "no 
trespassing" signs, but did not see any. [Tr., p.110, Ls.11-15.] All three 
officers travelled in the same vehicle. [Tr., p.109, L.23 - p.110, L.1.] 
While traveling on the road they never had to open any gates. [Tr., p.114, 
Ls.1-2.] When they arrived at the Howard residence, Otto remained on 
the roadway as Ward and Sweesy went to the door of the Howard 
residence. [Tr., p.109, Ls.4-13.] When there was no answer at the door, 
Sweesy and Ward came back and Sweesy walked "around the back of 
the house on the roadway and saw the suspected outhouse building." 
[Tr., p.109, Ls.14-17.] From the roadway, he was able to see the strings 
hanging in the shed/barn. [Tr., p.113, Ls.5-1 O.] When the defendant 
arrived and while they engaged with the defendant, the officers were 
spread out; with Ward ahead of Otto and then Sweesy. [Tr., p.115, Ls.2-
8.] The defendant pulled into the driveway and parked; he was walking 
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back and forth. [Tr., p.115, Ls.4-8.] Otto was present when Sweesy 
spoke to the defendant. [Tr., p.114, Ls.4-7.] The defendant was irate and 
upset; speaking fast and telling them they needed to get off his property 
and needed a warrant. [Tr., p.114, Ls.13-18.] Otto does not recall that the 
defendant mentioned a no trespassing sign. [Tr., p.114, Ls.19-22.] The 
only conversation Otto had with the defendant was when the defendant 
attempted to enter his residence. [Tr., p.115, L.19 - p.116, L.3.] From the 
time that the defendant told the officers to get of the property to the time 
the defendant said, "let's cut' em down," was approximately 10-15 minutes. 
[Tr., p.117, Ls.6-20.] 
The only restrictions on the movements of the defendant was in 
prohibiting him from entering to [sic] his residence, as officer safety was a 
concern. [Tr., p.195, Ls.16-21.] Sweesy's camera was on the tailgate, so 
they never told the defendant that he had to sit on the tailgate. [Tr., p.196, 
Ls.5-25.] His calls were also not restricted. [Tr., p.197, L.1 - p.198, L.5.] 
Otto's conversation with the defendant was limited. [Tr., p.197, Ls.14-18.] 
The defendant walked the officers to the marijuana plants when they 
began their search and extraction of the plants. [Tr., p.198, L.19 - p.199, 
L.5.] 
Otto observed the defendant execute the consent to search form. 
[Tr., p.199, Ls.21-23.] The search form was brought after the additional 
officers arrived on scene. [Tr., p.200, Ls.3-1 O.] Otto does not recall if that 
was the first time the officers discussed the consent to search with the 
defendant. [Tr., p.200, Ls.11-16.] Otto did recall that Sweesy, aftertaking 
the photos and before the other officers arrived, had a conversation with 
the defendant about consent to search or a search warrant. [Tr., p.200, 
L.17 - p.201, L.9.] 
(R.' pp. 39-43.) 
The state charged Howard with manufacturing a controlled substance 
(marijuana) and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.10-12.) Howard filed a 
motion "to suppress all evidence ... which was the direct or indirect product or 
otherwise the fruit of the warrantless entry upon the illegal search of Defendant's 
property occurring on or about August 21, 2011." (R., pp.14-15.) After an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court denied Howard's suppression motion, concluding: (1) 
regardless of whether the officers' driving on a private road to get to Howard's residence 
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constituted a trespass, Howard did not have a '"reasonable expectation of privacy' from 
those who may happen to travel on the Road[,]" including the officers; (2) when Det. 
Sweesy detected the odor of growing marijuana while standing at the front door of 
Howard's residence, he "had the implied invitation to be within the curtilage" of 
Howard's residence; (3) apart from when officers were in the "invited public" area of the 
curtilage of Howard's residence, they remained outside the curtilage until and 
throughout the time they observed -- in plain view from vantage points west of the north-
to-south "fence line" (see St. Ex. 4) -- marijuana growing in an outbuilding with gapped 
siding and roofing; and (4) after Howard arrived at his residence, he voluntarily 
consented to a search of his property for the suspected marijuana. (R., pp.37-65.) 
Howard filed a Motion to Reconsider and Brief in Support (R., pp.66-70), which was 
denied (R., p.84).3 
Howard subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing a 
controlled substance (marijuana), and the possession of paraphernalia charge was 
3 Howard's motion to reconsider his suppression motion was based upon United States 
v. Jones, 565 U.S. __ , 132 S.Ct. 945, 951 (2012), which explained, in a case where 
officers placed a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, "when the Government does 
engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain 
information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment." After 
reviewing Jones, the district court concluded: 
The Jones case does not concern factually the open fields doctrine. The 
Jones case does not concern the curtilage doctrine. 
I do not view the Jones case as having overruled either any of the 
prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent when addressing the open fields 
doctrine or the curtilage, specifically Oliver versus U.S. 
(Tr., p.228, Ls.10-23 (italics added).) 
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dismissed. (R., pp.85-88.) The court sentenced Howard to a unified 5-year term with 
two years fixed, all suspended, and placed him on probation for three years. (R., pp.91-
97.) Pfeiffer filed a Rule 35 motion, which the court denied. (R., pp.125-26.) Howard 
timely appealed. (R., pp.106-109.) 
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ISSUES 
Howard states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the District Court err when it denied both Mr. Howard's Motion 
to Suppress and his Motion to Reconsider? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Howard failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and his motion for reconsideration? 
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ARGUMENT 
Howard Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To 
Suppress And His Motion For Reconsideration 
A. Introduction 
Howard asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, first 
contending "[t]the evidence presented at hearing clearly established that the ISP 
Officers traveled on a private road, through a gate in a fence that was posted 'NO 
TRESPASSING,' and then continued to trespass on private property in order to gain 
any 'view' of suspected marijuana plants growing in a shed behind Mr. Howard's 
residence." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Howard also contends that the district court "erred 
by making findings of fact that were not supported by the evidence presented at hearing 
in order to conclude that the ISP Officers did not invade the curtilage of Mr. Howard's 
property." (Id.) Howard's claims fail. Application of the law to the facts shows the 
district court correctly concluded that law enforcement's actions in this case were 
constitutionally reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 
496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
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C. Howard Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
The state fully adopts the district court's well-written opinion as its argument on 
appeal, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A, and its oral decision on 
Howard's motion for reconsideration, which is attached as Appendix B. Additionally, the 
state relies upon facts set forth in its Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings, 
supra, which are supported by references to the record, to show that, contrary to 
Howard's argument, the district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
To the extent Howard challenges the district court's credibility determinations, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that appellate courts are to afford great deference 
to a trial court's credibility determination. See Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 
P.2d 133, 1336 (1982). In Rueth, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that "[t]his 
standard of appellate review is salutary in effect, and reflects the view that deference 
must be afforded to the special opportunity to assess and weigh the credibility of the 
witnesses who appear before it personally." ~ In Jensen v. Bledsoe, 100 Idaho 84, 
87, 593 P.2d 988, 991 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that "the trial 
judge is the arbiter of conflicting evidence; his determination of the weight, credibility, 
inference and implications thereof is not to be supplanted by this [appellate] court's 
impressions or conclusions from the written record." 
Because of this great deference, if "findings of fact are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not disturb 
those findings." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 619, 200 P.3d 
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1162, 1168 (2009); see also Benninger v. Derifield, 145 Idaho 373, 374, 179 P.3d 336, 
338 (2008). As explained in Benninger, "[iJt is the province of the district judge acting as 
trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." kl at 374, 179 P.3d at 338. Based on the testimony and evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing, and the deference afforded the trial court's 
credibility determinations, Howard has failed to show that the district court factual 
findings were erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and sentence 
entered upon Howard's guilty plea to manufacturing a controlled substance (marijuana). 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of July, 2013, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ANTHONY M. VALDEZ 
Valdez Law Office, PLLP 
2217 Addison Avenue East 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 






DERK HOW ARD, 
Defendant. 






MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
On February 14 and 15, 2012, the defendant's motion to suppress came on regularly for 
hearing. Calvin Campbell, Gooding County Prosecutor, appeared on behalf of the State of Idaho 
and Counsel, Tony Valdez, appeared on behalf of the defendant, Derk Howard, also present. At 
the conclusion of the testimony the parties were given 14 days to submit their closing arguments 
with authorities in writing. The time to file their written arguments expired on March 1, 2012; 
the parties failed to timely file any written arguments and authorities with the Court. 1 
1 The defendant filed his brief on March 12, 2012. The defendant argued that the open view doctrine does not apply, 
as the search OCCUITed in the curtilage of his home. He also argued that the good faith exception does not apply and 
the consent was tainted by an illegal search. 
I - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
• 
• 
Therefore, the Court, having considered the testimony; exhibits; and the motion to 
suppress filed by defendant, took the matter under advisement on March 2, 2012 for a written 
decision. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 30, 2011, the Idaho State Police (ISP) received an anonymous tip that there 
was a marijuana grow in a ravine in the vicinity of the defendant's residence, located at 373 
Spring Cove Road, Bliss, Idaho. 
On August 31, 2011, ISP Detective Sweesy (Sweesy), Agent Ward (Ward), and Trooper 
Otto (Otto) drove to the ravine to investigate the anonymous tip. They were dressed in plain 
clothes and were in an unmarked truck. They took Old Highway 30 to a dirt/gravel road (Road). 
This Road is surrounded by property owned by various owners, i.e. Faulkner Land & Livestock; 
the LDS Farms; Bosma Farms; and the Northside Canal Company. The Northside Canal 
Company also has a right-of-way to use the Road. The Road is a winding road that proceeds 
generally in an east/west direction. The properties adjacent to the Road are genefally north or 
south of the Road. 
The ISP officers drove to the ravine and walked the ravine. They could not find evidence 
of a marijuana grow. They then drove to the Howard residence and attempted to make contact 
with the defendant, who was not home. While knocking on the front door, Sweesy detected the 
odor of marijuana in the air, which was coming from the west. The officers then observed a 
structure to the northwest of the residence. Sweesy observed white strings hanging from the 
trusses and observed what appeared to be green plants, through the spaces in the slats of the 
outbuilding. 
2 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
• 
• 
The defendant filed bis motion to suppress challenging the constitutionality of the 
discovery/search of the marijuana and bis subsequent consent to search. In the defendant's 
Motion to Suppress he argues that evidence in this case should be suppressed pursuant to Article 
I, Sections 13 and 17 of the Idaho Constitution; the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution; Rules 4 and 41 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure; I.C. §§ 19-601-19-603, 
19-608-19-611, 19-615, and 19-4401-4420. 
n. 
TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS 
The following persons testified; the material aspects of their testimony may be 
summarized as follows: 
DETECTIVE JEROD SWEESY: Sweesy is a detective for the Idaho State Police (ISP) and 
has been employed with ISP for the last 20 years. He holds a Master Certificate from POST and 
has investigated approximately 75 to 100 marijuana grow operations. He is trained in the 
enforcement and eradication of marijuana grow operations, as well as other illegal narcotics 
investigations. Over the years of such investigations, he has had experience in deteeting the odor 
of marijuana, both processed and growing. On August 30, 2011, ISP received an anonymous tip 
that Mr. Howard, the defendant, had a marijuana grow in a ravine south of bis residence. After 
receiving this information, Sweesy went to Google Earth to locate the Howard residence and 
verify the existence of th5' ravine, which existed. 
On the morning of August 31, 2011, Sweesy, Ward, and Otto drove to the location of the 
anonymous tip. They turned onto a dirt/gravel road off of Old Highway 30 and proceeded 
generally east to a fork in the road. They then proceeded to the right, to a white building where 
the road ended. They then walked the ravine to the vicinity of the Howard residence. They did 
3 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
• 
• 
not locate or find any evidence of a marijuana grow. They then decided to make contact with Mr. 
Howard at his residence. The officers returned to their truck and proceeded back to the fork in 
the road, where they took the left fork further east, until they arrived at the Howard residence. 
They never observed any "no trespassing" signs. When they arrived at the Howard residence, 
they parked at a location qn the road just west of the Howard driveway. (Exhibit #4). 
The officers then exited their truck and walked up the Howard driveway to a 
path/walkway, which led to what they thought was the defendant's front door, which was on the 
east side of the residence. Ward knocked on the door and he and Sweesy waited for an answer 
for approximately 30 to 45 seconds. While at the door, Sweesy detected the odor of marijuana 
coming from the west. He testified that there was a light wind coming out of the west. When 
there was no answer, they returned to their truck. Sweesy then walked west in an attempt to 
determine where the marijuana odor was coming from. As he walked west on the road; he 
observed what he described as an open air shed/barn that was northwest of the residence. He 
testified that from the road, he observed white strings hanging from the trusses of the shed and 
spaces of the siding of the shed allowed him to observe an "emerald green" color hiside the shed. 
Sweesy testified that the color he observed was consistent with marijuana plants and that it is 
common in grow operations to use the hanging strings to support the growing marijuana plants. 
Sweesy then retrieved a camera from his vehicle and began taking photos from the road. 
(Exhibit #5, Photos 9251-61). Photos 9251 and 9252 depict the Howard residence. Photos 
9253-55 depict west side of the Howard residence, from the road; the shed to the northwest of 
the Howard residence; and a brown truck and backhoe west of the Howard residence and a white 
Suburban southwest of the shed, between the shed and the residence. Sweesy proceeded to take 
photos from an open field west of a fence line that separated the open filed from the Howard 
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residence and the shed. Photos 9256-61 depict various views of the shed with and without the 
use of a zoom lens. Sweesy testified that the photos taken show the white strings hanging from 
the trusses of the shed and depict the green marijuana plants through the gaps in the cedar siding. 
After taking the photos, Sweesy was at the southwest comer of the fence line and road 
when the defendant arriv~ at the residence. After taking the photos, Sweesy called Sgt Fullmer 
to start the paperwork for a search warrant. Sweesy testified that the defendant arrived in a 
brown truck with a passenger. He identified the brown truck in Photo 9253, as the truck the 
defendant arrived in. Sweesy identified himself to the defendant as an ISP officer. The 
defendant told the officer, multiple times, that they were trespassing and had to leave. Sweesy 
asked the defendant if he was growing marijuana; the defendant denied such. Sweesy asked the 
defendant if he wanted to see the photos and the defendant responded, "I don't need to." Sweesy 
advised the defendant that he was in the process of obtaining a search warrant and advised the 
defendant that he had two options: (1) consent to a search and he would not be arrested or (2) he 
would obtain a search warrant. Sweesy further advised the defendant that he had the right to 
refuse to consent. The defendant responded by saying, "let's cut' em down." ·Sweesy then 
advised Fullmer that the defendant had consented to a search and a search warrant was not 
necessary. Sweesy requested ''raid equipment" to take and package the evidence he obtained. 
He also asked for additional assistance to carry out the search. Other ISP officers arrived to 
assist, approximately 30 minutes after the request. The scene was videotaped and photographed 
before any evidence was taken. 
The interactions and conversations with the defendant were not recorded. Sweesy 
assumed that the road from Old Highway 30 to the Howard residence was a public road. Sweesy 
did not see the ''no trespassing sign" on the Howard property until it was mentioned by the 
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defendant It would not have been visible from the direction in which the officers approached 
the property. According to Sweesy, the defendant was free to leave, but was not free to enter his 
property 1llltil the evidence had been collected. The defendant was never placed in handcuffs. 
TROOPER STEVE OTTO: Otto has been a patrol officer for ISP for 4 years. He has POST 
certification at the intermediate level and he has training in the area of detecting controlled 
substances. He participated in the investigation of Mr. Howard on August 31, 2011. The officers 
exited off Old Highway 30 onto a dirt/gravel road. As they were travelling on this road, Otto 
was "actively looking" for "no trespassing" signs, but did not see any. All three officers 
travelled in the same vehicle. While traveling on the road they never had to open any gates. 
When they arrived at the Howard residence, Otto remained on the roadway as Ward and Sweesy 
went to the door of the Howard residence. When there was no answer at the door, Sweesy and 
Ward came back and Sweesy walked "around the back of the house on the roadway and saw the 
suspected outhouse building." From the roadway, he was able to see the strings hanging in the 
shed/barn. When the defendant arrived and while they engaged with the defendant, the officers 
were spread out; with Ward ahead of Otto and then Sweesy. The defendant pUiled into the 
driveway and parked; he was walking back and forth. Otto was present when Sweesy spoke to 
the defendant. The defendant was irate and upset; speaking fast and telling them they needed to 
get off his property and needed a warrant. Otto does not recall that the defendant mentioned a no 
trespassing sign. The only conversation Otto had with the defendant was when the defendant 
attempted to enter his residence. From the time that the defendant told the officers to get of the 
property to the time the defendant said, "let's cut' em do~" was approximately 10 -15 minutes. 
The only restrictions on the movements of the defendant was in prohibiting him from 
entering to his residence, as officer safety was a concern. Sweesy's camera was on the tailgate, 
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so they never told the defendant that he had to sit on the tailgate. His calls were also not 
restricted. Otto's conversation with the defendant was limited. The defendant walked the officers 
to the marijuana plants when they began their search and extraction of the plants. 
Otto observed the defendant execute the consent to search form. The search form was 
brought after the additio~ officers arrived on scene. Otto does not recall if that was the first 
time the officers discussed the consent to search with the defendant. Otto did recall that Sweesy, 
after taking the photos and before the other officers arrived, had a conversation with the 
defendant about consent to search or a search warrant. 
DERK HOW ARD: Howard, the defendant, has resided at 373 Spring Cove Road, Bliss, Idaho 
for nine years. The property is owned by the North.side Canal Company, the defendant's 
employer. The defendant has been employed with the canal company for approximately 17 
years. He is responsible for the maintenance of the canals adjacent to his residence, as well as 
other canals owned by the canal company. The property owned by the canal company, upon 
which the defendant lives, consists of approximately nine acres, including an open field west of 
the residential structure and outbuildings. The property boundary is marked in red on Exhibit #4. 
The open field to the west and the residential property to the east are separated by wooden posts 
and barb wire fence, which extends north to south. The improved portion of the property consists 
of a circular driveway, to the east; a detached garage, to the northeast; an open air shed/barn, to 
the northwest; and the house, to the south of the shed/barn and garage and to the west of the 
driveway. The defendant rents this property from the canal company at $5.00 per month, as part 
of his employment. The only access to his property is from Spring Cove Road, from the east, or 
from Old Highway 30 on the dirt/gravel road, from the west. The defendant maintains the 
dirt/gravel road from the west, upon which the canal company has a right-of-way. This road 
7 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
• 
'-1-3 
• ' l 
passes to the south of bis property. When one accesses this Road from Old Highway 30, s/he first 
crosses over a cattle guard. Some distance to the left of the cattle guard, is a ''no trespassing" 
sign. As one proceeds east on the Road, where the road tums to the left, there is an irrigation 
canal with a head gate to control water flow. At the top of the head gate there is a "no 
trespassing" sign spray ~ainted in orange, which is intended to keep people off of the canal 
structure. The defendant admitted that one cannot see the "no trespassing" sign on the video 
(Exhibit #1), but that one can see it while driving. To the west of the defendant's property, 
adjacent to the north side of the Road, there is a "no trespassing" sign, which would be visible to 
a vehicle travelling westbound on ·the Road. At the entry to his driveway, if one were 
approaching from the east, is a "no trespassing'' sign. On the Road there are various points where 
there are sometimes gates. Gates are put up on the Road if he does not want people to come 
through or if there are cattle grazing. 
There is a ravine south of the defendant's residence, which generally runs east to west. It 
is also owned or managed by the North.side Canal Company. In the open filed to the west of the 
defendant's residence, he occasionally keeps horses or cows in the field. There were no horses or 
cows in the field on August 31, 2011. There was ·a horse in the barn. To the northwest of the 
residence is the backyard and barn/shed. The defendant estimated that it is approximately nseven 
steps from his back porch to the ham/shed." 
On the morning of August 31, 2011, the defendant was working for the canal company 
and was not at his residence. He was in the area "riding ditch." He was not in the area depicted 
in Exhibits #3 or #4. The defendant returned to his residence when he received a call stating that 
someone was at his house. He received that call from Ben Hepworth. Hepworth was on the 
canal bank southeast of his residence when he made the call. Hepworth said he thought the men 
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were looking at the Suburban and broken-down Ford, which were listed for sale. The two 
vehicles were located near the shed/barn; within five yards. The defendant testified that he 
returned home in his company truck and parked next to a brown truck, which was broken down. 
From the time of the call, it took the defendant approximately ten minutes to arrive at his 
residence. When he arriv~ he testified that he saw three men on his property, behind his house. 
He testified that one of the men was just south of the shed/barn and the other two were standing 
north of the road, but south of his house. The defendant testified that it was Sweesy who was just 
south of the shed/barn. The defendant marked, with an ''x", where the three men were located 
when he arrived. When the defendant got out of his truck, he spoke first to the officers. He spoke 
first to Otto and told him he was trespassing and needed to leave. Sweesy immediately started to 
walk towards him. The defendant did not observe the officers doing anything other than 
standing on the property. When he arrived, he did not see Sweesy with a camera. The defendant 
stated that when he arrived, Otto and Ward told him to go sit on the tailgate of their truck, which 
was parked in his driveway. Sweesy then came over to the truck, got his camera, and walked 
back down the road to the fence line and walked the fence line and took pictures. There were no 
police cars at the defendant's residence, other than a ''navy blue four door dodge." The three 
officers did not identify themselves as police officers until after the defendant told them to leave. 
The defendant tried to enter his house to get a video camera, but the officers would not let him. 
The defendant tried to enter the house at least two times, but he was instructed by the officers not 
to enter. Sweesy offered to show the defendant the photos he had taken, but the defendant was 
aware of what they depicted. The defendant told this Court that he tried to make phone calls, but 
he was told he could not make any calls by Otto. After being at the residence for approximately 
20 minutes, the defendant said, "let,s go cut'em down," referring to the marijuana plants. During 
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this 20 minute period, before the defendant said, "cut' em down," he overheard Sweesy make a 
call. Sometime later after that call, Sweesy gave the defendant the option to wait for a search 
warrant or consent to the search. Sweesy told the defendant that if he gave permission, he would 
not go to jail. The defendant signed a consent to search form. He was not arrested at the scene, 
nor placed in handcuffs oi: in a police vehicle. When the officers began the search, he went with 
the officers and was present in the shed/barn during the search. 
The defendant does not have mail delivery at his residence; nor does he recall ever 
having any UPS or FedEx deliveries. 
BEN HEPWORTH: Hepworth is a co-worker of the defendant's, employed by the Northside 
Canal Company for the last five years. He is a "ditch rider." He has been familiar with the 
defendant's residence for approximately nine years. On August 31, 2011, in the morning, 
Hepworth was working for the canal company and was on the canal bank located southeast of the 
Howard residence, when he saw a vehicle at the residence that he did not recognize. It was in 
the driveway of the defendant. He called the defendant. Hepworth then left his location and 
drove along the ditch bank of the canal to a location north of the Howard residence. From that 
location he saw three men on the defendant's property, who appeared to be north of the road as 
well as southwest of the residence. He marked their positions with an "O'' on Exhibit #4. 
EXIDBITS 
The parties stipulated to the admission of the following Exhibits: 
State Exhibits-
# I- Video 
#2- CD Howard photos-taken 10/5/2011 from 2:41 pm to 3:06 pm 
#3- Google Earth aerial map 
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#4- Google Earth aerial map - close-up 
#5- CD ISP photos (this CD contains a log of the date and time of each photo) 
-#9251-9261: taken 8/31/2011 from 11:01 am to 11 :07 am 
-#1853-1879: taken 8/3112011 from 11:28 am to 12:01 pm 
#6- ISP Consent to Search form 
Defendant Exhibits-
#A- Northside Canal Company letter 
Pursuant to I.RE. 201, the Court hereby takes judicial notice of the contents of the 
Affidavit of Probable Cause in Support of Criminal Complaint/Citation, dated September 7, 
2011. 
The parties stipulated that the dirt/gravel road (Road), which the officers travelled upon 
to arrive at the Howard residence, is not a publicly maintained roadway. 
m. 
STANDARD 
The 4th Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and was applied 
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). "[A]ll evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state 
court." Id 
Katz v. US protects the privacy of those that exhibit an actual expectation of privacy and 
that expectation is one that society is willing to accept as reasonable. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). An 
unlawful search and seizure can only occur where the defendant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Id at 360. 
Courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage, which is the area or 
buildings immediately adjacent to a home which a reasonable person may expect to 
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remain private even though it is accessible to the public. However, the presence of a 
police officer within the curtilage does not, by itself, result in an unconstitutional 
intrusion. Just as there is an implied invitation for citizens to access a house by using 
driveways or pathways to the entry, police with legitimate business are entitled to enter 
areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to public use. A criminal investigation is as 
legitimate a societal purpose as any other undertaking that would normally take a person 
to another's front door. Therefore, when the police come onto private property to conduct 
an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to 
places ordinary vi~itors could be expected to go, observations made from such vantage 
points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. 
State v. Linenberger, No. 36962, 263 P.3d 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State 
v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 243 P.3d 1093, 1094 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Veldez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993 (1995)). On appeal, "[t]he standard of review of a suppression 
motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the court of 
appeals] accept[ s] the trial court's :findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, 
but ..• freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id 
(citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 926 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
The defendant argues that the search of the property, which he rented from the Northside 
Canal Company, was a wa:mmtless search to which no exception applies and that his subsequent 
consent to search was tainted. 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 30, 2011, Sweesy received an anonymous tip that there was a 
marijuana grow in a ravine south of the Howard residence at 373 Spring Cove Road located in 
Bliss, Gooding County, Idaho. 
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2. Sweesy, through the use of Google Earth, verified that there was a ravine south of 
the Howard residence. The Howard residence, "373 Spring Cove Road, Bliss, Idaho" when 
entered into Google Earth, shows the location of the Howard residence to be adjacent to and 
north of the Road, which the officers travelled on to arrive at the residence. 
3. On the m~rning of August 31, 2011, Sweesy, Ward, and Otto drove from Old 
Highway 30 to a non-publically maintained dirt/gravel road (Road) and then drove to the ravine. 
They walked the ravine and did not find any evidence of a marijuana grow. The ravine is owned 
or managed by the Northside Canal Company. 
4. On August 31, 2011, there were no gates in place that would prevent travel on the 
Road and, while there is evidence that there were "no trespassing" signs at various locations off 
of the road, there were no signs that clearly prohibited or restricted travel on the Road. 
5. After finding no evidence of a marijuana grow in the ravine, the three officers 
decided to make contact with the defendant, to further their investigation. They drove on the 
Road, eastbound to the Howard residence. From the ravine to the Howard residence, there were 
no closed gates to restrict or prohibit traffic. The officers parked their blue truck south of the 
Howard residence, on the Road west of the defendant's driveway. Sweesy and Ward walked up 
the Howard driveway to a concrete pathway the front door of the Howard residence. Where the 
officers entered the HowE;U'd driveway, where the walkway began, there was no gate or "no 
trespassing" sign. The "no trespassing" sign posted on the Howard property was at the eastern 
entrance and was not visible to the officers when they first arrived. Ward knocked on the door. 
After 30 to 45 seconds, they determined that no one was home. While at the door, Sweesy 
detected the odor of marijuana coming from the west of the house on a slight breeze. 
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6. The defendant rents approximately rune acres from the Northside Canal 
Company. The majority of the nine acres are an open field to the west of the Howard residence. 
There is a north/south wire and wood fence on the east end of the open field. The improved 
portion of the property, to the east of the fence line, consists of a residential house; a detached 
garage to the northeast of the house; and various other structures including, the open air 
shed/barn, which is located to the northwest of the house. The Road runs east and west to the 
south of the Howard property. From the Road, there is a driveway with two entrances east of the 
Howard residence. On August 31, 2011, there was a white Suburban and a white Ford truckjust 
to the southwest of the shed/barn. There was a brown truck and a backhoe southwest of the 
house. The Howard residence is the only residence within miles. The property is bordered by a 
canal to the north and farm ground or pasture to the east, west, and south. 
The south and east grass yard is bordered by vertical, wooden, fence posts at regular 
distances, without any horizontal barrier. (Exhibit #5, Photos 9251-52). 
7. The officers walked back to their truck and attempted to determine where the 
marijuana odor was coming from. From the Road, the officers observed the shed/barn northwest 
of the residence. From the Road, Sweesy observed white strings hanging down from the trusses 
of the shed/barn. Through the gaps in the siding, he observed an emerald green color. Based on 
his observations and experience, Sweesy suspected that marijuana plants were growing within 
the shed/barn. Sweesy took two photos of the barn/shed from the Road. (Exhibit #5, Photos 9253 
& 9254). The photos depict the open air roof and the south siding of the shed. There is no 
testimony as to the distance from the edge of the Road to the shed/barn. The defense has not 
challenged what Sweesy could or could not see from the Road. 
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8. Ben Hepworth, a coworker of the defendant, observed the officers and their 
vehicle (although he did not know they were law enforcement at that time) and notified the 
defendant that they were on bis property. Hepworth testified that when he was southeast of the 
Howard residence, from an unknown distance, he observed a vehicle he did not recognize in the 
defendant's driveway. ~owever, this testimony is not credible, because the photographic 
evidence does not show a blue truck on any portion of the Howard property. (Exhibit #5, Photos 
9251-55). Hepworth testified that when he was north of the Howard property, on the canal bank, 
from an unknown distance, while driving, he observed the officers in the vicinity of the white 
Ford truck and the white Suburban, listed for sale. The Court finds that Hepworth's observation 
of the location of the officers' truck and the officers is not reliable, nor credible. 
9. The defendant arrived at bis residence approximately ten minutes after the call 
from Hepworth. The defendant testified that he arrived at his residence in a canal company truck, 
which he parked next to the brown truck that was southwest of bis residence. When he testifie~ 
he was referring to Exhibit #4. (This brown truck is depicted in Exhibit# 5, Photos 9253-55). 
The testimony of the defendant, as to where he parked, is in conflict with the photos taken by 
Sweesy. 
10. The testimony of Sweesy and Otto is in conflict as to the location of Sweesy when 
the defendant arrived and when Sweesy took photos 9251-61. According to Sweesy, he had just 
completed taking the photos and was at the southwest comer of the property, near the west fence 
line, when the defendant arrived. According to Otto, Sweesy began taking the photos after the 
defendant arrived. The Court finds, based on Sweesy's photos 9253 -55, that the defendant and 
Otto are mistaken in their testimony, because there is no other vehicle parked next to the brown 
truck other than the backhoe. There is no evidence of a Northside Canal Company truck on the 
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property of the defendant, prior to the Sweesy photos being taken. At 11 :05 a.m., the defendant 
had not yet arrived home when photo 9255 was taken. The Court must find that photos 9251-61 
were taken before the defendant arrived at his residence. According to Exhibit #5, photos 9251-
54 were taken at 11 :01 am from the Road south of the Howard residence; photo # 9255 was 
taken at 11:05 am; photo~ 9256-58 were taken at 11:06 am; and photos 9259-61 were taken at 
11:07 am. Photos 9255-61 were taken from various locations west of and along the fence that 
separated the open field from the improved portion of the defendant's property. 
11. The testimony of Otto and Sweesy, as compared to the testimony of the defendant 
and Hepworth, conflict as to whether the officers were ever within the curtilage after there was 
no answer to the officer's knock at the door. The officers testified that they were either on the 
Road or west of the fence line. According to Hepworth, the three officers were in the vicinity of 
the two white vehicles, south of the shed/barn and north of the Road. According to the defendant, 
upon his arrival, Sweesy was on bis property just south of the shed/barn and Ward and Otto were 
just north of the Road, just west of the brown truck, on bis property.· 
Hepworth was clearly mistaken as to the location of the officers' truck. Hepworth was 
north of the Howard residence and on the north side of the canal, in his vehicle and made the 
observation while driving. The Court will find that it is probable that he was mistaken as to their 
location on the property. as opposed to their location on the road or west of the fence line. 
12. The defendant also testified that when he arrived, Sweesy was up near the 
shed/barn and that Ward and Otto were left of the brown truck on his property. The Court, 
. 
having found that the defendant's testimony is not credible as to when the photos were taken by 
Sweesy, must find that bis testimony is not credible as to the location of the officers when he 
arrived. When the defendant arrived, he did not know that the three individuals were officers and 
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he told them to leave. After he discovered they were law enforcement, he told them they needed 
a warrant to search. This Court must find that the photos taken by Sweesy were taken prior to the 
defendant's arrival and are in direct conflict with his testimony that the photos were taken after 
he arrived. The Court finds that Howard's testimony of the location of the officers on his 
property, east of the fence line when he arrived, is not credible. 
13. The last Sweesy photo was taken at 11 :07 am and it was shortly thereafter that the 
defendant arrived at his residence. 
14. Sweesy asked the defendant if he was growing marijuana on his property, which 
he denied. Sweesy asked the defendant if he wanted to see the photos that had been taken. The 
defendant responded that he did not need to see the photos. Sweesy, after taking the photos 
(Exhibit #5), contacted Fullmer to start working on a search warrant for the Howard residence. 
15. Within 15 to 20 minutes after the defendant arrived, Sweesy discussed options 
with him. Sweesy said told the defendant that if he consented to a search he would not be 
arrested, but he would be arrested if the officers had to procure a warrant. Sweesy did not have 
any written consent to search forms. After considering his options, the defendant orally 
consented to the search. Sweesy notified Fullmer that a search warrant was not necessary, since 
the defendant had consented. Sweesy asked for additional officers and "raid equipmenf' to assist 
in the search and eradication of the marijuana. 
15. Prior to the eradication of the marijuana grow, the officers videotaped the scene 
and photographed the marijuana grow inside the shed/barn. The marijuana grow on the Howard 
property was photographed between 11:28 am to 12:01 pm. (Exhibit #5, Photos 1853-79). The 
videotape of the scene was not offered into evidence in this proceeding. 
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16. Additional officers arrived within 30 minutes of Sweesy's call to Fullmer to assist 
with the search and eradication of the marijuana grow. The additional officers arrived after the 
defendant's oral consent to search. The defendant executed a written consent to search on August 
31, 2011 at 12:15 pm; after other officers had arrived to assist in the collection of evidence and 
the removal of the marij~ plants. 
B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i. Open View Doctrine 
A warrantless search consisting of observations made by law enforcement from a location 
where the public has a right to be either under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or 
Article I, § 1 7 of the Idaho Constitution, may be analyzed under the "open view doctrine." 
"Under the open view doctrine, a police officer's observations made from a location open to the 
public do not constitute a search. This is because one cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in what is knowingly exposed to public view." State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146-
47, 953 P.2d 583 (1998) (citingKatzv. United States, 389U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)). 
The Court, in State v. Prewitt, 136 Idaho 547, 551, 38 P.3d 126 (Ct. App. 2d01), stated: 
Although citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas immediately 
surrounding their homes, not all areas of the curtilage are equal in terms of privacy: 
[T]he presence of a police officer within the curtilage does not, ipso facto, result in an 
unconstitutional intrusion. There is an implied invitation for the public to use access 
routes to the house, such as parking areas, driveways, sidewalks, or pathways to the 
entry, and there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy as to observations which can 
be made from such areas. Like other citizens, police with legitimate business are entitled 
to enter areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to public use. 
The ability of police to move within the curtilage, however, is not unlimited. 'Police 
officers without a warrant are permitted the same intrusion and the same level of 
observation as one would expect from a 'reasonably respectful citizen.'' Id 
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In this case, the testimony reveals that Sweesy ob.served the shed/barn. from the Road and 
from an open field, west of the north/south fence line. His observations were made both with and 
without the aid of a camera with a zoom lens. The constitutionality of Sweesy' s observations is 
dependent upon whether he was in a place that he had the right to be at the time he made the 
observations, i.e. was S~eesy within or outside of the Howard curtilage when he made his 
observations of the shed/barn? 
According to the testimony offered at the suppression hearing, it was only Sweesy who 
first detected the odor of marijuana while at the door of the Howard residence. It was also 
Sweesy who observed the marijuana in the shed/barn. As for the observations of Sweesy of the 
shed/barn, he denies ever being on the Howard property east of the west fence line; west of the 
Howard residence; and north of the road. The defendant relies upon his testimony and the 
testimony of Hepworth, as to the location of the three officers and their vehicle. The 
photographic evidence taken by Sweesy and the time sequence of those photos, clearly contradict 
the testimony of the defendant that those photos were taken after he arrived. Further, the 
photographic evidence contradicts the testimony of Hepworth as to the location of the officers' 
blue truck, as the photos clearly depict that there is no blue truck on the Howard property. The 
Court, therefore, finds that the defendant and Hepworth are either not credible or are mistaken in 
their testimony, as to the location of the officers and/or their vehicle being. The Court would find 
that the only time the officers were within the curtilage was when they walked to the door of the 
Howard residence, prior to detecting the odor of marijuana. 
ii. Curtilage & ·Trespass 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution safeguard "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
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effects against unreasonable searches and seizures .... " These constitutional provisions are 
designed to protect an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). "These constitutional 
safeguards of the privacy of 'houses' extend to the curtilage of a residence, which is in the areas 
or buildings immediately adjacent to a home that a reasonable person would expect to remain 
private, even though it is accessible to the public." State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 115, 175 
P.3d 801 (Ct. App. 2007). In State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 467, 943 P.2d 52 (1997), our Court 
concluded the United States Supreme Court's definition of curtilage for Fourth Amendment 
analysis did not adequately reflect the privacy interests of Idaho citizens under Article I, § 17, of 
the Idaho Constitution. In State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472, 20 P.3d 5 (2001), the Court 
stated, in reliance upon Webb: 
.•. we conclude the United States Supreme Court's definition of curtilage for Fourth 
Amendment analysis did not adequately reflect the privacy interests of Idaho citizens 
under Art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. We did not reject the reasoning of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but found the factors to determine curtilage as outlined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 
(1987) should be applied as "useful analytical tools." Id. at 467, 943 P.2d at 57. However, 
in formulating a definition of curtilage that would better ensure Idaho citizens' reasonable 
expectations of privacy were met, this Court found the Dunn factors should be applied in 
the context of the setting or locality of the residence itself, with consideration given to the 
differences in custom and terrain within different areas of the state. Id. Our analysis in 
Webb was based on the unique rural tradition and custom in Idaho that defines Idahoans' 
sense of protected space, and expectation of privacy, within their property. The 
recognition of the differences in a rural and suburban home for the purposes of defining 
curtilage is a special consideration in Idaho. 
Tue facts in Webb, were that law enforcement officers had an anonymous tip regarding a 
marijuana grow on Webb's property that consisted of a 20 acre parcel of rural land, located 
outside the city limits of Hagerman. A fence line surrounded the entire 20 acre parcel. The fence 
was in poor condition and consisted of wooden posts and barb wire. When law enforcement 
officers first found evidence of a suspected marijuana grow, Webb was not living on the 




property, although he did own the property. There was a well house, shop and trailer house on a 
portion of the property. Access to the shop, and trailer house was by a driveway. There was a 
gate and a "no trespassing" sign located at the road entrance to the trailer house. This was the 
only "no trespassing" sign on the property. The law enforcement officers gained access to the 
property in an area where there were wooden fence posts, but no wire between them. Over a 
period of two years, officers made access to the property from the same general area, to observe 
evidence of the marijuana grow. The Court, in affirming that the marijuana grow was not within 
the curtilage of Webb's property, stated: 
When determining whether an area comes within the curtilage of a defendant's residence, 
the trial court must first consider the four factors set forth in Dunn. By so holding we do 
not suggest that the factors are to be rigidly applied, but rather, are to be used as '~eful 
analytical tools". Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1139-40. 
Secondly, we hold that when the trial court assesses the curtilage boundaries, in addition 
to considering the Dunn factors, the court should apply them in the context of the setting 
or locality of the residence itself. For instance, the curtilage of a home located within the 
city limits of Boise may not be the same as the curtilage of a ranch located in one of 
Idaho's rural counties. The trial court must therefore take into consideration the 
differences in custom and terrain within different areas of the state when contemplating 
particular expectations of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518, 
524 (Ct.App.1991) (overruled in part on other grounds) ("In New Mexico, lot sizes in 
rural areas are often large, and land is still plentiful. Our interpretation and application of 
the state constitution must take into account the possibility that such differences in 
custom and terrain gave rise to particular expectations of privacy when the state 
constitution was adopted.") We believe that this formulation of curtilage will better 
ensure that Idaho citizens' reasonable expectations of privacy will be met. 
Webb, 130 Idaho at 467. 
In State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 230-31, 923 P.2d 469 (Ct. App. 1996), the Court of 
Appeals also recognized that the Idaho Constitution provided a broader protection of curtilage 
than did the 4th Amendment. The Cada Court stated: 
The Idaho appellate courts' past discussions of curtilage have recognized that curtilage 
encompasses domestic outbuildings that are close to and associated with a dwelling. State 
v. Sindak, 116 Idaho 185, 188, 774 P.2d 895, 898, (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076, 




110 S.Ct. 1125, 107 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1990) ("Curtilage is commonly defined as the 
enclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling house."); 
State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313, 859 P.2d 344, 349 (Ct.App.1993) (referring to 
curtilage as the "area or buildings immediately adjacent to a home which a reasonable 
person may expect to remain private even though it is accessible to the public."); State v. 
Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 272, 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Ct.App.1992) (same); Ferrelv. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 106 Idaho 696, 698, 682 P.2d 649, 651 (Ct.App.1984) ("curtilage" refers 
to a small piece of land, not necessarily enclosed, around a dwelling house, generally 
including building~ used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs.). 
This Court, therefore, is to consider the Dunn factors and then consider those factors "in 
the context of the setting or locality of the residence itself." The four factors for this Court to 
consider in Dunn, consist of: (1) the proximity to the home of the area claimed to be curtilage; 
(2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put; and ( 4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from the 
observation of people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. In this case, unlike Mr. Webb, the 
defendant was living on the subject property, which he rented from his employer. As to the first 
factor, :from the testimony of the defendant and the officers, as well as the photographic 
evidence, the shed/barn in which the marijuana was being grown was in close proximity to the 
house. From the testimony of Sweesy, he recognized that the shed/barn was within what he 
viewed to be the curtilage. As to the second factor, the house and the shed/barn are enclosed by a 
wood and metal, to the west. The fence, from the southwest comer of the west fence line, 
extends east partway along the road, south of the shed/barn, where there is a gap in the fencing. 
Vehicles can park in that gap, on the defendant's property, west of his residence. There are 
wooden fence posts with no wire between them, south of the Howard residence, along the 
roadway which extend to the driveway, east of his residence. The north/northeast side of the 
Howard property is bordered by a large canal; owned by the Northside Canal Company. This 
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area forms somewhat of a triangle. To the west of the north/south fence line, which is the west 
boundary of the improved portion of the Howard property, is a large open field, which is part of 
the property owned by the Northside Canal Company and is part of the property rented by the 
defendant As for the third factor, it is clear that the area of the property occupied by the 
defendant and his family, east of the west fence line, was used as is typical of a family, although 
it does not appear that the shed/barn was well maintained. The open field, west of the fence line 
separating it from the shed/barn and house, was used on occasion to graze cows and horses. The 
fence was maintained to keep the grazing livestock confined to the open field. As for the fourth 
factor, the marijuana grow was located in' the poorly maintained shed/barn and was visible from 
the Road, south of the Howard property, and from the west side of the fence line. 
The defendant's residence is somewhat isolated, although it is surrounded by various 
canals that he and Hepworth are required to maintain in their employment Therefore, it would 
not be uncommon for the defendant's employer or other employees to be in the area. The 
Howard residence is bordered by the property of other landowners, who use it for either growing 
crops or grazing livestock. Hepworth is aware that it is not uncommon for the public to hunt in 
the area, provided they had the landowner's permission. Hepworth admitted that he had initially 
hunted in the open field rented to the defendant without the permission of the canal company. 
The curtilage would clearly only encompass the property to the east of the fence line; south of 
the North.side Canal and north of the Road. 
A trespass is not a constitutional violation unless it "represents an invasion of a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 272, 846 P.2d 918 (Ct 
App. 1992). The use of the non-public road by the ISP officers did not violate the defendant's 
right of privacy, nor was there any clear indication that access on the Road was in anyway 
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restricted. In Prewitt, 136 Idaho at 549, officers used a "private road" to arrive at the defendant's 
residence. Further, certain entries into the curtilage are not constitutionally protected, i.e. those 
persons who are impliedly invited. The Court in Tietsort, 145 Idaho at 115, stated: 
Even under Idaho constitutional jurisprudence, however, not all entries by law 
enforcement officers onto the curtilage of a home infringe upon constitutionally protected 
expectations of privacy. Under the open view doctrine, when the police come onto 
private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and 
restrict their movements to places where ordinary visitors could be expected to go, 
observations from such vantage points are lawful. Id; State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 
312-13, 859 P.2d 344, 348-49 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 272, 846 
P.2d 918, 923 (Ct.App.1992). Direct access routes to the house, including driveways, 
parking areas, and pathways to the entry, are areas to which the public is impliedly 
invited. Police officers restricting their activity to such areas are permitted the same 
intrusion and the same level of observation as would be expected from a reasonably 
respectful citizen. Cada, 129 Idaho at 232, 923 P.2d at 477; Clark, 124 Idaho at 313, 859 
P .2d at 349. The scope of the open view doctrine is limited, however, by the implied 
invitation to enter. Consequently, "a substantial and unreasonable departure from the 
normal access route will exceed the scope of the implied invitation and intrude upon a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest." Clark, 124 Idaho at 314, 859 P.2d at 350. 
"As set forth in Cada, there are several factors to be considered in determining whether 
an officer exceeded the scope of open view, including whether the officer acted secretly or 
openly, the time of the day or night when the officers approached, and whether the officers 
attempted to talk with the resident. Id at 233, 923 P.2d at 478." Prewitt, 136 Idaho at 550. In 
Rigoulot, 123 Idaho at 272, the Court held that when police come onto the curtilage of a home 
for a legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places where ordinary visitors would be 
expected to go, their observations from such vantage points are not unlawful. In State v. Clark, 
124 Idaho 308, 313, 859 P.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court held that the direct access routes to 
a house, including parking areas, driveways and pathways to the entry, are areas to which the 
public is impliedly invited, and that police officers restricting their activity to such areas are 
permitted the same intrusion and the same level of observation as would be expected from a 
"reasonably respectful citizen." In this case, the officers arrived at the residence in the day time 
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and were merely attempting to make contact with the defendant to further their investigation. 
While walking to the front door, Sweesy detected the odor of marijuana Since Sweesy had the 
implied invitation to be within the curtilage in order to make contact with the defendant to 
further his investigation, his detection of the odor of marijuana was not a constitutional violation. 
State v. Rigoulot, 123 I~o 267, 272-273, 846 P.2d 918, 923-924 (CtApp.1992). The officers 
then returned to the Road, where Sweesy made his observation of the suspected marijuana grow. 
He made further observations west of the fence line. Lastly, Sweesy's use of a camera to aide or 
enhance his observations from a place where he had a right to be is not an unconstitutional 
intrusion. Ky/lo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2043 (200l)(the use of technology 
to intrude into a constitutionally protected area is a violation where the technology is not in 
general public use); State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct App. 2001); State v. 
Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 147, 953 P.2d 583, 587 (1997) (search was based on speculation as 
to what the officers could have seen since there was no evidence that officers used binoculars 
that were available). 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is reasonable to beiieve that the 
curtilage consisted of the improved portion of the property, occupied by the defendant and his 
family, east of the fence line. The observations made by Sweesy were outside of the curtilage. 
The officers viewed the Howard property during the day time, in the open, and they arrived at 
the residence intending to speak with the defendant. Their actions were not covert and, therefore, 
did not constitute an "intrusive method of viewing." The officers had a legitimate reason to 
make contact with the defendant, to further their investigation, and did not unlawfully enter the 
curtilage to do so. The use of the path to the Howard residence, where they detected the odor of 




marij~ was not a constitutional violation, in as much as the officers had an implied invitation. 
The "no trespassing" sign was at a location not visible to the officers. 
The officers drove to the Howard residence on the Road, and the Road passes through 
properties owned by Faulkner Land and Livestock, Northside Canal Company, and others. It is 
not openly restricted as to who can or cannot travel on it. The Road connects with Spring Cove 
Road. Irrespective of whether their travel on the Road was a trespass, the defendant did not have 
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" from those who may happen to travel on the Road. 
Therefore, any observations made by Sweesy, from the Road or west of the fence line, that were 
in plain view, do not form the basis of an unconstitutional, warrantless search. 
iii. Consent 
The defendant claims that his consent to search was not voluntary or was otherwise 
tainted by an unlawful search. Since the Court has found that the search was lawful, the issue of 
taint is moot. 
As to the issue of whether the consent was voluntary, the defendant was aware that the 
detectives had reason to believe that he was growing marijuana At the time he consented to the 
search there were three law enforcement officers present. The defendant talked with Sweesy. 
Sweesy offered to show him the photos. Sweesy informed him they were in the process of 
obtaining a warrant to search. There is no evidence that there were any weapons drawn by the 
officers. The defendant was not handcuffed and was free to leave, according to Sweesy. Sweesy 
told the defendant that he had two options: (1) he could consent and not be arrested or (2) the 
officers would obtain a warrant and he would be arrested. Sweesy did advise the defendant that 
he did have the right to refuse to consent. "Where an officer informs a suspect that the officer 
intends to do something that the officer is legally authorized to do under the circumstances, such 




conduct does not ammmt to coercion. See State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 779-80, 152 P.3d 645, 
650-51 (Ct.App.2006).'' State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 911, 243 P.3d 1093 (Ct. App. 2010). 
A defendant's consent is not rendered invalid merely because an officer has said that a warrant 
will be sought if consent is refused. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 489, 163 P.3d 1194 (2007). 
However, under certain circumstances, false representations of law enforcement may render a 
consent involuntary where the officer represents that he has a warrant to search when such a 
warrant does not exist or where the officer erroneously or falsely represents the ability to obtain a 
warrant Tietsort, 145 Idaho at 119. This Court has determined that the information obtained by 
Sweesy, i.e. the detection of the odor of marijuana and the observation of the marijuana plants, 
were constitutional, Sweesy did not misrepresent or falsely state that he could get a search 
warrant 
At the time that the defendant orally consented to the search, there were three plain 
clothed officers present and they had one unmarked truck. The defendant was not detained and 
was free to leave. The officers never drew their guns. Sweesy told the defendant what his 
options were: (1) consent or (2) wait for a search warrant. Sweesy advised the defendant that he 
had the right to refuse consent and that they could do it the easy way or the hard way. Clearly, 
the defendant was not in custody at the time he orally consented. The fact that Sweesy may have 
stated that the defendant would be arrested if he elected to wait for the warrant is not coercive. 
State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577-78, 225 P.3d 1169 (2010); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 
779-80, 152 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2006) ("an officer's implied or explicit offer not to arrest a 
suspect if he 'turns over what he has' is not coercive if it merely informs the suspect of the 
officer's intention to do something that is within the officer's authority based on the 
circUillSta.nces"). 




CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
IT SO ORDERED. 
DATED this d I day of MaJ1ff.. , 2012 ... 
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APPENDIX B 
RULING ON HOWARD'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SUPPRESSION 
DECISION: 
All right. Thank you. All right. The court has reviewed the 
authority, the court has reviewed the Jones case. The Jones case does 
deal with the placement of a GPS device upon a vehicle. The Jones case 
does not concern factually the open fields doctrine. The Jones case does 
not concern the curtilage doctrine. 
I do not view the Jones case as having overruled either any of the 
prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent when addressing the open fields 
doctrine or the curtilage, specifically Oliver versus U.S. The federal courts 
and the state courts have recognized that a trespass in the context of a 
Fourth Amendment violation is only relevant to the extent that it represents 
an invasion of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In my view, when the officers entered onto the gravel road from 
U.S. Highway 30 at the cattle guard, certainly, at that particular location 
that's being discussed here, Mr. Howard, at that location had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
However, as the court indicated in - and it was in State versus 
Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, a 1982 Court of Appeals decision, the court did 
indicate there that posting no trespassing signs may indicate a desire to 
restrict unwanted visitors and announce one's expectation of privacy. 
However, the court would note that there is no evidence that Mr. Howard 
was the one that posted the no trespassing sign at the location of the 
cattle guard. 
In fact, I will indicate further that the evidence did not, at the 
evidentiary hearing, did not support the fact necessarily that there was 
such a no trespassing sign posted at the time of the entry by the officers. 
As the court recalls the testimony of Mr. Howard when he was 
viewing the sign, he was merely indicating that that is a no trespassing 
sign in the video taken by the officers, and I do not recall that there was 
any direct testimony that the trespassing sign was present in August at the 
time that the officers made the entry. 
But I think the court, in Rigoulot, does support the court's 
memorandum decision. The court does not believe that the discussion in 
Jones alters the court's decision, so the court will deny the motion for 
reconsideration. 
(Tr., p.228, L.8 - p.230, L.11.) 
